The architecture of Neo-Ottomanism part 3

Continuing from the last post titled, “The architecture of Neo-Ottomanism part 2” which can be accessed here (which is based on an article by Basil Markezinis which can be found here), Markezinis continues to Davutoglu's theory in four steps (read on conjuction with last two posts):

3) The above are used to justify and promote the role of Turkey as a peace-loving mediator in the region, but also to present it as a country with a “multidimensional, complementary foreign policy”. In this way it can be active in Russia, in the Caucusus, the Middle East and Africa, all without “negating the traditional Western friendly [sic] feature of Turkey (United States - NATO - EE), but to supplement it”.

4) Thus, Turkey should take an active part in all international forums and international organizations choosing as representatives its most charismatic citizens. The overiding aim of these measures is to promote Turkey's image abroad and to promote its economic interests.

To be continued........

Source: To Ethnos on Sunday (Basil Markezinis), Antipodes

The architecture of Neo-Ottomanism part 2

Continuing from the last post titled, “The architecture of Neo-Ottomanism part 1” which can be accessed here (which is based on an article by Basil Markezinis which can be found here), Markezinis outlines the theoretical framework of Davutoglu's thought:

The theory of Davutoglou is centred on the idea that the strength and future of a country depends, first from its “geopolitical depth” - geographic position secured within the Muslim world in general via the control of the major straits (Bosphoros, Suez, Hormouz, Malacca, and also partially Gibraltar) which separate the warm seas of the world, and on the other hand, it also risks an “internal systemic competition” – from its historical depth. The combination of these two he named “strategic depth”.

Then Markezinis then outlines the theory in four steps (only two translated today):

1. Davutoglu's argument starts from the area of religious doctrine - Christian and Islamic - in which he makes his first claim, that there is no incompatibility between Islam and Western democracy. This claim is developed along two axes. Firstly, Davutoglu highlights the resurgence of all the major religions in modern political dialogue - especially in America - thus preventing, very intelligently, any objection to religion as a factor that "infects" political thought. Secondly, he correctly points out that the Koran simply proposes a set of fundamental values without imposing a specific political mechanism for their implementation. In order to show that these values are not foreign to our own - because, despite his emphasis on Islam, he believes that Turkey has a critical role to play in Europe, and in which he considers a European country - he lists examples such as “the justice, humanity, equality and freedom”.

2. Then when he focuses on the full integration of Turkey in the EU, his argument is conducted in a different way, beyond the religious or philosophical. Davoutoglou relies on these two ways: he uses Turkish history; and furthermore, he also argues that this integration will be beneficial for Europe, because only this way can it hope to become a “global player”. Once again, after having made a theoretical proposal, he does not support it by concrete evidence. The basis of the argument is conducted in a very skillful way, using arbitrary spatial shifts, which make the conclusions of the author at least debatable. The history used for his argument is based on a broad understanding of the geographical size of the country in the past. It suffices to present a few excerpts from his text in order to clarify our analysis.

"Turkey is an Asian country, a European country, a neighbor of the African continent directly connected to the Eastern Mediterranean, a Balkan country, a Middle Eastern country, Caucasian country, a Central Asian country, a country of the Caspian Sea and, indirectly, a Gulf country (because of its association with the Gulf via Iraq)"

To be continued.....

Source: To Ethnos on Sunday (Basil Markezinis), Antipodes

The architecture of Neo-Ottomanism part 1

Basil Markezinis regularly writes articles in Greek newspapers on foreign policy. Often his ideas are controversial but they are hardly ever irrelevant. He has also been a legal adviser to the Queen Elizabeth II of England is a member of seven foreign Academies. By the way he has also been knighted by the Queen Elizabeth II; however, since Greeks do not recognize titles this is irrelevant.

Markezinis has just written another insightful article published in the Greek newspaper, The Ethnos on Sunday (which can be accessed here) on Turkish Foreign Minister, Ahmet Davutoglu, his ideas and Turkish foreign policy. Some believe Davutoglu is the theoretical architect of Turkey’s re-discovered Ottoman outlook often called "Neo-Ottomanism". Antipodes has written about Neo-Ottomanism and Davutoglu several times before which can be accessed here and here and even Greek Neo-Ottomanism which can be found here.

Recently, there is no doubt that Turkey has been demonstrating an ability to adapt to the new geo-strategic environment (following the collapse of the Soviet Union); specifically, developing multi-dimensional foreign policy initiatives and interventions from the Middle East to Caucasus and even as far as China. However, what are the ideas which underpin these manoeuvres?

Markezinis begins by providing valuable and often unknown information on Davutoglu, Turkey's foreign minister:

The first indication that Davutoglu’s way of thinking would prove decisive in the transformation of Turkish political culture came with the publication of his doctoral thesis, “Alternative Models: The impact of Islamic and Western world perspectives on political theory” (available in English from 1994). His work is characterised by containing aspects of most good theses: he appears widely read, he has abstract tendencies, uses excerpts from several languages and includes a dose of personal ideology. The author's focus is the importance of Islam; which, according to Davutoglu had been “exploited” by the West. One further indication of his robust academic background and the stability of his views is that Davutoglou repeatedly questions the American and Kemalist doctrines.

Markezinis alludes to something very important here which has, and is likely to continue, to re-orientate Turkish foreign policy going forward. Rather than eschewing the Islamic world view in favour of European Enlightenment-inspired but the essentially Asiatic despotism of Kemalism (which has driven Turkish foreign policy over the last 90 years or so), Davutoglu believes the Islamic world view should underpin Turkish foreign policy. Markezinis continues:

Over the next few years he further developed his ideas, starting with an article written in 1988, entitled “A Conflict of Interest: An explanation of World Ataxias”. The article questioned the ideas of the major thinkers of the period e.g. the "globalization of political values and institutions of Western civilization” of Fukuyama, the (inevitability) of the “clash of civilizations” of Huntington (who overlooked the fact that the most destructive wars were not between different cultures but “wars within civilizations between systemic forces of Euro-western culture”), and the individual theory of Huntington of a permanent “Islamic threat” - which helped to shape Davutoglu's next theoretical step.

Davutoglu then went on to argue that Turkey (and by implication Islam) could help to promote co-existence, and not, as pursued by the Americans, the homogenization of cultures. These views found fullest expression, three years later, in his book “Strategic Depth: The international position of Turkey”, published in 2001 in Turkish.

In March 2003, with the advent to power of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) of Erdogan, the ideas of Davutoglou were progressively incorporated into Turkish foreign policy.

We should recall that the Ottoman Empire was governed by a "millet system" where the subjects of the Sultan were grouped amongst their various religions and governed by a religious leader with the Sultan as the supreme leader. Is this the sort of system that Davutoglu is referring to when he writes that Islam can help to promote co-existence?

To be continued......

Source: The Ethnos on Sunday (Basil Markezinis), Antipodes

Nabucco gets the go ahead, Turkey's hand strengthens

Antipodes has previously written about the Nabucco and South Stream gas pipelines and their geopolitical and economic importance here and here.

Further to these developments, the inter-governmental agreement for the construction of the 3,300 kilometre Nabucco pipeline, which will connect Europe to gas-rich Central Asia via the Balkans, Turkey and the Caucasus, was signed in Ankara on July 13. The Nabucco website can be found here. Nabucco is expected to carry around 30 billion cubic metres of gas a year (this is only 20% of what Russia exports to Europe) with an estimated cost of around 8 billion euros. The construction will begin in 2010 and is expected to be completed by 2015. The pipeline will be built by a consortium of multinational companies.

The agreement was signed by the prime ministers of Austria, Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, Turkey and the President of the European Commission. The signing ceremony was also attended by heads of state and government of more than 10 countries with the notable absence of representatives from Russia and Turkmenistan - interpreted as disapproval of the pipeline by Moscow. Apparently, the realization of Nabucco is of strategic importance for Europe, as Brussels is seeking to reduce their dependence on hydrocarbons from Moscow. As part of their efforts, the Europeans are succoring the political support of Washington, which never fails to miss an opportunity to pinprick Russia. As expected, there was an assortment of flowery speeches by Turkish prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan and European Commission President, Jose Manuel Barroso on how Nabucco will help to build bridges between Europe and Asia.

Unfortunately, for the supporters of Nabucco, the sources of that gas remain unclear. Azerbaijan has only enough for Nabucco's early stages and they remain non-committal and Iran is excluded on political grounds. However, Kurdistan (northern Iraq) is potentially another supplier. And so is Turkmenistan but they are stuck between satisfying Russia or the European Union.

However, the construction of the pipeline has potentially important consequences for Greece and Cyprus. A recent article which can be accessed here published in Greek weekly, The Paron by K.Vosporitis believes the signing of the agreement; despite the uncertainty of supply, strengthens the position of Turkey as a “key” transit country in the international energy map. Vosporitis comments:

The signing of the inter-governmental agreement regarding the Nabucco gas pipeline is of particular importance for Turkey, as Ankara plans raise its position as a strategic partner of the EU, in the crucial energy sector. This development will become more visible, when the construction of the pipeline is completed, and it will ultimately enable Ankara to have a significant say in European affairs. The pipeline, which will cross the territories of Turkey, will probably be ideal leverage against Western centers of power, which maintain reservations about Turkish membership in the EU.

In the case where Ankara makes future use of her privilege, to control the flow of gas to Europe as it pleases - a possibility which should not be dismissed - in order to achieve political, financial etc. objectives, then one wonders who benefits from this arrangement? Moreover, France was the first country to taste the bitter experience of exclusion from the project, following the stubborn refusal of Ankara, possibly as a sign of dissatisfaction for the negative attitude of the French President towards Turkey’s EU membership aspirations. Furthermore, the widely circulated perception; particularly in the European press that Ankara, despite the frustrations of the Turkish side, claimed that 15% of the gas passing through the pipeline will be for domestic consumption, and will be subject to specially discounted prices, was obviously not viewed very favorably by the Europeans.

Vosporitis then raises an important question about the financing sources of this exorbitantly costly project. How in the middle of the global financial crisis will at least 5 billion euros be invested in Turkey for the construction of the Turkish section of the pipeline? Not surprisingly, the doyens of the Anglo-American financial and business elite and their propagandists, The Economist magazine (and surely its benefactors) strongly support Nabucco. A recent article, characteristically depicting Turkey as the "saviour" of Western civilisation and Russia as the evil one, can be found here.

Finally, Vosporitis then points out how the Nabucco pipeline is intimately intertwined with Greek foreign relations and how Turkey's increased leverage is likely to be used to extract concessions from Greece:

Modern political history shows us that Ankara knows how to exploit its geographic location - typical was the inconclusive stance it took during the Second World War, and the refusal in 2003 to allow the passage of U.S. military forces from its territories during the invasion in Iraq - to gain political and economic benefits. With the completion of the Nabucco pipeline, there is a risk, the negotiating position of Ankara will be massively strengthened against the Europeans. This would have serious consequences for Greek national issues, starting with Cyprus, where a new “Annan Plan” has already been launched, even though Nicosia is desperately pushing for the implementation of the Ankara Protocol.

Note: The Ankara Protocol is the extension of the EU customs union to the recent new member countries including Cyprus. Turkey had refused to sign the Protocol due to Cyprus.

Source: To Paron (K.Vosporitis), Antipodes

The Neo-Ottomans stumble (again) over Pan-Turkism

Judging by their efforts in the 1990’s, it was only a matter of time before the Neo-Ottomans stumbled. The Turkish Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, got himself into hot water a couple of weeks ago by suggesting that the recent violence in the capital of the Chinese province of Xinjiang, Urumqi involved “genocide”. Refuting this claim, China’s official media says the latest death toll is 192 with at least 46 of them Uighurs.

The Economist magazine recently published an article, titled “Troubles across Turkestan” providing an outline of events which can be found here. Note: it is interesting The Economist magazine has bought into the language of the Pan-Turkic movement i.e. the usage of Turkestan and not naming Xinjiang as a Chinese province. Antipodes has previously highlighted here, The Economist magazine’s robust support for the Turks at the expense of everyone else including the Greeks. The Rothschilds, the owners of The Economist magazine, probably have a lot to lose if Turkey is isolated from the West.

As if Erdogan’s words were not enough, the Turks went even further when Turkey’s trade minister hinted strongly that Turkish consumers should boycott Chinese goods. Erdogan also proposed a discussion of the rioting in the UN Security Council. However, this is very unlikely to happen considering China holds veto power.

Obviously, Turkey’s increasingly Neo-Ottoman self perception, where they believe they can engage with a variety of geopolitical actors on a number of levels shaped by the recent ministerial appointment Ahmet Davutoglu, has motivated it to support the hapless Uighurs. Turkey believes it has cultural, religious and ethnic links with the people of Xinjiang; consequently, Turkey has long been a haven for its disaffected people.

However, Turkey has definitely gone too far this time. Perhaps it overestimated Pan-Turkic solidarity. Pan-Turkism is a political movement started more than 100 years ago aiming to unite the various Turkic peoples into a modern political state. More recently, Pan-Turkic ideas and "re-unification" movements have been popular since the collapse of the Soviet Union in Central Asian and other Turkic countries. In particular, Turkey went clumsily gallivanting around Central Asia trying to build a Pan-Turkic movement. The results were less than encouraging. Alarmingly, the idea of Pan-Turkism also stretches beyond Central Asia and into Europe. Recently, when Erdogan was in Germany, he told cheering Turkish workers and Germans of Turkish ancestry that “assimilation is a crime against humanity”. But, recent Pan-Turkic sympathy for their supposed ethnic brethren in China, has been muted.

However, what is more worrying is Turkey’s relationship with certain geopolitical actors in the West; particularly, their rabid supporters, the United States, the United Kingdom and a few other pathetic small European states like Sweden. It is not out of the realms of possibility that the Americans and the English will use Turkey to irritate China without doing the work themselves, and invariably further promoting Turkey as a global power. As a result, keep a close watch on all the supposed well-researched studies that will be published from American "think-tanks" and English periodicals over the next few months alluding to Turkey's historical relationship with the Uighurs.

Source: The Economist, Antipodes

The Turkish state and its American pimps

Over the last 30 years, Turkey's activities in the United States trying influence policy and opinion makers have been exceptional. The acquiescence of some Americans; supposedly the purveyors of freedom, democracy, human rights, rule of law and truth, has been utterly disgraceful.

Mario Evryviadis has recently written a good article about the activities of the Turkish state within American circles which can be found here. He begins by pointing out the pervasive influence of Turkey in the United States:

If we only limited ourselves, to the so-called think tanks and related institutions/foundations of America, whose goals are to influence American foreign policy, we notice that not one lacks a Turkish presence. This influence takes the form of either donations, for supposedly funding research programs, or the presence of Turkish researchers (or the presence of Americans) whose partisan positions and sometimes absolute slavishness toTurkish propaganda, is supported by very crude research.

The best results of Turkey’s activities in Washington (originally dating from 1975 after the Cyprus invasion) was recently seen with the presidency of Barack Obama which has literally taken to the last iota the positions and views of a think-tank of the Democratic Party, the Center for American Progress (www.americanprogress. org) which have been recorded in a study by Spencer P. Boyer and Brian Katulis, "The Neglected Alliance: Restoring US-Turkish Relations to Meet 21st Century Challenge", December 2008.

The study that Evryvidis cites can be found here. Evryvidis draws our attention to the date of the abovementioned paper (December 2008) which was right in the middle of the transitional period of the presidential election during which the Transition Team formulates the program and activities of the new U.S. administration. Obviously, the study was written with a view to influencing the incoming Obama administration.

Consequently, Clinton-Obama's first visit to Turkey in early 2009, closely follows the study's policy suggestions. Evryvidis then points out that if you look at the end of the study where they attribute thanks and acknowledgements, there are listed all the Turkish "lechers" of Washington. In addition, the sources of funding are from Germany and Turkey. Therefore, Turkish money is helping to formulate U.S. foreign policy facilitated by an assortment of American pimps. Evryvidis then highlights the main characteristics behind Turkey's lobbying:

First, the Turks know what persons, situations, think-tanks, etc. have the upper hand in both political parties at any time. Secondly, they know that to conduct their work there has to an adequate flow of cash. In the case of Turkey, there are some interesting exceptions on how they operate. The Turks are not stingy and they allocate the most capable diplomats to follow the recipients of Turkish finance and donations, ordering them and literally draining the juices from them. They do not allow the tail of the dog to guide them. They guide the dog, leaving him periodically starved.

Regarding their conquest of America power centres (and educational institutions), the Turks had excellent guidance from the Jewish-American lobby. Jewish-Americans took them by the hand in 1975 and taught them how to short-circuit the decision-making system in the U.S; and specifically, how to operate in Washington and how to direct financing to various institutes/foundations, which number in their hundreds in the U.S.

Today, one is not exaggerating if they claim that the Turks have done a better job than their teachers in this field. And our only consolation is that the Turks have become increasingly autonomous from the Jewish-American lobby, truly believing that their country is more important than Israel to the U.S. Therefore, they find it increasingly more difficult to curb their inherent anti-Semitism, as is proved daily by the government of Erdogan.

Evryviadis then lists the think-tanks and institutes/foundations which have been financed directly or indirectly by the Turkish state, they include:

Council of Foreign Relations, RAND, Brookings, Carnegie Endowment, CSIS, Hudson Institute, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Jamestown Foundation, Eurasia Foundation, German Marshal Fund of the U.S., U.S. Peace Institute, Center for American Progress, Middle East Progress, Center for New American Security, New America Foundation, Century Foundation, Stanley Foundation.

Additionally, Evryviadis writes that other groups dealing with energy and terrorism, whose financing remains obscure, always have a good word about the Turks and how important they are to the safety of the United States and the West. Evryvidis continues on the results of Turkey's systematic lobbying efforts:

Finally, if somebody reads closely the policy-orientated books that are about Turkey in the U.S., which all point out the “strategic” or “central” role of Turkey for the West and the innumerable villains that will confront the world if Turkey “is lost” by the West, they will realise a few interesting things.

The donations and financing, if they do not emanate from Ankara, emanate from hyper-conservative and reactive American institutes, as the John M. Olin Foundation, the Scaife Family Foundation, the Smith Richardson Foundation etc. the last one, as an example, financed Henri Barkey (background from the Constantiniople) and Philip Gordon with USD$100,000 for a series of anti-Cypriot studies that promoted the Turkish position that Turkey will make war if Cyprus is included in the European Union. Also, Philip Gordon has replaced Daniel Friend as the new U.S. Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, with responsibilities that include the Cyprus issue and Greek-Turkish relations.

Source: Infognomon (Mario Evryvidis), Antipodes

Greece and Cyprus are caught in a trap

Dimitris Konstantakopoulos’s articles have been highlighted before on Antipodes. One of those posts can be found here and Konstantakoppoulos’s website can be found here.

Konstantakopoulos has recently written another insightful article on the complex geostrategic issues facing Greece and Cyprus. There have been rumours the Turkish government is planning to re-open of the Halki seminary as a concession to Greece, separate from their obligations to Greece and Cyprus regarding their accession to European Union. It should also be noted that a significant amount of pressure for the Halki re-opening comes from the United States government and various American organizations. However, Greece and Cyprus find themselves in a trap. Konstantakopoulos expands:

These “concessions”, if, and when they occur - because Ankara usually makes promises it does not keep - are combined and do not contradict the intense pressures which are simultaneously implemented (e.g. Aegean) as part of their goal to continue unimpeded in their EU accession course and also to achieve one of Ankara’s primary goals of state sovereignty over the Aegean/Cyprus.

Ankara requests “reciprocity”, i.e. Greek concessions, every time they consider fulfilling their obligations. In the case of Halki, in return they request the expansion of rights of the Muslim minority in Thrace. Simultaneously, the Turkish consul in Komotini, has gone beyond its diplomatic terms of reference by going from village to village and acting rather like a “political leader” of the “Turkish minority”, rather than a foreign diplomat, despite repeated misgivings expressed by the regional government. In the end, rather than the Turkish diplomat complying, the governor ceased to attend many events attended by the diplomat! As for the leadership of the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, it appears to be ignoring the information provided by the secret services on Turkish activities in Thrace.

In contrast, no Greek government has ever dared to remind Ankara about what happened to the Greek minority in Turkey which was expressly protected by the Treaty of Lausanne. Konstantakopoulos then continues about the role being played by the United States on some of the abovementioned issues:

Meanwhile, Washington is now pressing for quick solutions to the problems impacting the external relations of Greece such as Cyprus, the Aegean and Macedonia. Also, American diplomats have indirectly but clearly posed the question of a “review” of the status quo of the Aegean (Treaty of Lausanne). For example, the extremely philo-Turkish Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Gordon deplored the low flyover flights over the Greek island of Agathonisi by the Turkish airforce, requesting the suspension of these activities, essentially to allow for a Greek-Turkish dialogue on “disputed issues” of sovereignty.

Undoubtedly, Ankara will make it appear to the US and the EU that it is caving in, presenting it as a concession, and then requesting allowances from the Greeks. This is a tactic that has regularly been followed by Mehmet Ali Talat in Cyprus. This tactics works because Greece and Cyprus have fixed objectives in maintaining a “good climate” in relations between Greece and Turkey whereas Turkey has never made the same sacrifices. Therefore, Turkey has greater strategic flexibility compared to Greece.

Konstantakopulos further clarifies the strategic mistakes made by Greece and Cyprus regarding to Turkey's EU access process and the limited set of choices that are currently available to them:

The problem is not tactical but strategic. Greece has declared a policy of “full integration and full compliance” for Turkey's entry into the EU; however, they practically consented to launch negotiations without raising the issue of removing Turkish demands and threats in the Aegean or the recognition of Cyprus. This “tactic” led Ankara into an extremely advantageous win-win position. Either they continue the tough stance, possibly extracting more Greek concessions, or they agree to Greek requests, demanding requisite reciprocations from Nicosia and Athens. For example, if they open the ports to Cypriot trade, it would appear strange to other EU members for Greece or Cyprus to veto opening new chapters because Turkey does not recognize Cyprus.

It makes no sense to put major issues such as the protection of Greek and Cypriot sovereignty from threats, occupation and assorted claims at the end of the accession process. This is because the process will stop, without Greece-Cyprus gaining anything and attracting the ire of Turkey and EU members or we are made to finally accept Turkey into the EU with all its demands.

Source: Dimitris Konstatakopoulos, Antipodes

The integration of Diaspora Greeks into Greek national life part 2

Diplomatic Periscope has recently posted an article by Mr. Ioannis Touloumakou, Professor of the Faculty of Philosophy at Aristotle University of Thessaloniki. The article is an attempt to trigger a discussion on the role of the Greek Diaspora (or more accurately the Omogeneia) on Greek and Cypriot national life and Hellenism more broadly. Antipodes posted some of the proposals put forward by Touloumakou yesterday which can be found here.

To repeat, Touloumakou believes it is critical that the Greek Diaspora, despite its heterogeneity, should, and can be, a critical factor in the national strategy; particularly, today as the nation confronts a plethora of internal and external problems.

Touloumakou provides several proposals for the reform of Greek political life and requisite revision of the Constitution which will concern Greeks living abroad. They include the election of representatives of Greeks living abroad (Greek citizens) to the Greek parliament in a proportion determined by certain factors and for the President of the Republic to prepare and speak at the end of each year at the Parliament House; following the budget debate, “On the state of the Nation”, which will include comprehensive references on all the issues facing Greeks living abroad.

Touloumakou provides an interesting set of proposals (some have been largely incorporated) that focus just as much on the Diaspora's rights as their obligations. The Greek Diaspora often conveniently forgets that along with representational rights also come obligations to Greece.

Furthermore, it will be difficult to get broad agreement from Greek society and the Diaspora but at least his article does demonstrate that there are people who are thinking about utilising such a valuable resource as the Diaspora for the renewal of Hellenism. Like almost everything Greeks do, they construct the most wonderful ideas - such as Plato's Republic or the Byzantine cosmosystem (Contogiorgios) - but its in the implementation in which we fall down. The recent bickering in the Greek parliament, on how the Greek Diaspora will be represented, shows the Greeks have a long way to go.

Source: Diplomatic Periscope (Ioannis Touloumakou), Antipodes

The integration of Diaspora Greeks into Greek national life part 1

Diplomatic Periscope recently posted a thoughtful article by Mr. Ioannis Touloumakou, a Professor of the Faculty of Philosophy at Aristotle University of Thessaloniki. The article is an attempt to trigger a discussion on the role of the Greek Diaspora (or more accurately the Omogeneia) in Greek and Cypriot national life, and Hellenism more broadly. Antipodes will provide a two part series of translations from that article.

Touloumakou believes it is critical that the Greek Diaspora, despite its heterogeneity, should, and can be, a critical factor in the national strategy; particularly, today as the nation confronts a plethora of internal and external problems. However, Touloumakou points out the Greek Diaspora and its personalities, its history, geographical distribution, achievements and problems, is notably absent from the Greek school curriculum. Furthermore, the Greek Diaspora is hardly mentioned in the daily or periodical press and media of Greece.

Touloumakou then goes on to provide a series of ideas for the integration of Hellenes living abroad into Greek national life:

1. The establishment of a Ministry of Emigrants (the Greek Government had promised a Ministry to Greek parliamentarians from foreign countries after the 2004 Olympic Games, in which 25% of the Greek athletes were emigrants). The organization and responsibilities of this (independent) Ministry should be subject to a special study of specific factors by Greeks and Greeks abroad;

2. The reorganization of the Council of Hellenes Abroad (S.A.E) in accordance with the requirements arising from the (newly formulated) national strategy;

3. The establishment of an independent television channel with satellite range or the conversion of the existing Parliament House channel into an emigrant station;

4. The representation of Hellenes abroad in a new “National Institute of Educational Studies”, which will replace the currently (expensive and generally failed) Pedagogical Institute (and also a “Central Educational Council”) or the “National Institute for Radio and Television”, the “National Film Centre” and “National Book Centre”;

5. The reorganization of the education of Greek children abroad in close cooperation with the Church, whose role in this field, as in others, relating to cultural and social life of emigrants, was and is a national necessity;

6. The naturalization of young people of Greek origin under certain conditions, one of which (the most important) should be service (military or social) in the armed forces. The acute demographic problem, national defence program that cannot be addressed by professionals (and mercenaries) soldiers (especially after the recent reduction in the duration of military service) but above all the important educational role of the military in developing national and social consciousness, makes bringing volunteers of Greek communities abroad into the armed forces particularly important;

7. The introduction of Greek Olympic games every four years with the participation of young people from Greece, Cyprus and Greek communities abroad (and possibly foreigners, who know the Greek language and culture well); and

8. The establishment of Historical Museums for Diaspora Greeks in the capitals of the states, provinces or other jurisdiction which are comprised of many Greek immigrants.

To be continued.........

Source: Diplomatic Periscope (Ioannis Touloumakou), Antipodes

Greek investment in F.Y.R.O.M falls sharply

Nations are engaged - alongside their national companies - in offensive policies to conquer external markets and to take control of sectors of activity considered to be strategic. For Nations today, the quest for power and assertion of their rank on the world stage depends more and more on their economic health, the competitiveness of their companies and the place that they occupy in world trade. In this world which is becoming global, nation’s political interests are taking second place to economic interests. This shift signals the start of a new era, that of geo-economics.

The above passage was written in 1999 by Pascal Lorot, the renowned French political scientist, economist and president of the Institut Choiseul for International Politics and Geoeconomics, as part of a larger commentary on the emerging discipline of geo-economics. Although, the recent credit crisis has probably seen a re-emergence of the State at the expense of the economy in international relations, Lorot was documenting an increasingly important phenomenon.

However, the author most responsible for the current usage of the term geo-economics was Edward Luttwak which Antipodes has written about previously here. As described by Luttwak in 1993, the term geo-economics means nothing more than "the continuation of the ancient rivalry of the nations by new industrial means". War has been substituted by industrial conquest. Geo-economics describes a situation in which instead of "measuring progress by how far the fighting front has advanced on the map”, “worldwide market shares for the targeted products” that are the yardstick.

The implication of Lorot and Luttwak's thesis is that geo-economic strength can change power relations between nations - which may lead to subjugation or domination. Therefore, the news that Greek investment in F.Y.R.O.M has dropped sharply is disappointing.

The articled titled “FYROM: Significant reduction of Greek investment” written by Alexandra Gkitsi and published in Greek at Euro2Day describes how there has been a significant drop of Greek investment in neighbouring F.Y.R.O.M. Relying on reports from the Office O.E.Y. at the Greek Embassy in Skopje, a Skopjan newspaper reported that Greek investors have begun to withdraw from F.Y.R.O.M and have left “the field open for the Slovenian capital”.

According to the Central Bank of F.Y.R.O.M, in 2008 Greek investments were only 12 million euro, of which 2 million were reinvested profits, while the remaining 10 million were loans awarded to ensure ongoing operations of companies. The above figure shows a significant reduction of investment when compared with that of 2007, which amounted to 44.6 million euros (5.3 million equity, 35.5 million reinvested earnings and 3.8 million euro loans) and 2006, which amounted to 40.7 million euros (3.1 million equity, 35.3 million reinvested earnings and 2.3 million loans).

More than likely something is happening, in terms of economic relations between the two countries Greece and F.Y.R.O.M, and the underlying reasons are probably political (i.e. problem with the name "Macedonia"). If this trend continues any potential for Greek political leverage declines.

Source: Euro2Day (Alexandra Gkitsi), Antipodes

"Paradise Lost" by Giles Milton, another agent of Neo-Ottomanism: Part one

Over the next few weeks Antipodes will provide a series of posts reviewing the book, "Paradise Lost: Smyrna 1922 The Destruction of Islam's City of Tolerance" written by Giles Milton and published in 2008.

Paradise Lost purports to provide a history of the life of the inhabitants of Smyrna before the Asia Minor Catastrophe of 1922. It also claims to provide some background on the political events and personalities that led to the Turk's final bloodthirsty pillage. However, despite the author's somewhat fluid writing style the book only acts as another instrument of an insidious ideology that has been growing rapidly but steadily in the minds of Western and Turkish elites.

Much like the despicable "Salonica: City of Ghosts" by Mark Mazower, Giles Milton concludes that the cosmopolitan life renowned the world over and commercial strength of Smyrna was only made possible by the enlightened Ottoman administration (he is generally scathing of the nationalist Turks). However, a person with only a passing knowledge of Ottoman history will conclude that it was the lack of Ottoman administration that allowed Smyrna to become so envied. In addition, he primarily writes the history from the perspective of the Levantine families of Smyrna (French and English families which had settled there 200 years before but had retained their nationality) including first person narratives collected from their personal letters and diaries. This is strange because the majority population in Smyrna was Greek with sizeable populations of Armenians, Jews and Turks. Obviously, their stories were not important enough to tell in the same detail.

In summary, Milton's history is incomplete and bedevilled by Western prejudices. Most importantly he really comes across as just another agent of the growing ideological edifice of Neo-Ottomanism, created and spread by European, American, Turkish and even some Greek people and organisations. They generally believe that the Balkans and the Eastern Mediterranean was, and will be, best governed by a benevolent 'Islam-lite' Turkey implementing mostly Anglo-American neo-liberal political and economic policies for their own benefit. Barak Obama's recent trip to Turkey and his outrageous overtures to the Turks was an obvious manifestation of this line of thinking.

Not surprisingly, one of the most enthusiastic mouthpieces of Neo-Ottomanism, the Economist magazine, thought the book was balanced. Of course they would as their average reader would conceive of themselves as the Levantine families depicted in Milton's book, lording it over their uncivilised and unruly Balkan, Mediterranean and Oriental subjects, with a newly Ottomanised modern Turkey acting as policeman and bully.

Source: Paradise Lost (Giles Milton), Antipodes

The illusion of Greek-Turkish friendship Part Two

This is part two of a series of translations selected by Dr Ioannis Mazis which appeared on the Anixneusis website (a talk show on Greek television channel ET3). The first part of this series can be accessed here. The translations are from a book titled "Stratejik Derinlik” (or Strategic Depth in English) first written in 2001 by the newly appointment Foreign Minister of Turkey, Ahmet Davutoglu.

Dr Ioannis Mazis, is the professor of Geopolitics and Economic Geography at the Ionian University. Mazis seeks to highlight how Greek commentators have selectively used readings from Davutoglu’s books to make inferences which are not matched by Davutoglu’s writings on Greek and Cypriot relations with Turkey.

[Sub-title] The strategic Gordian knot of Turkey: Cyprus

Cyprus, which occupies a central position in the global continent [Eurasia] - located almost equidistant from Europe, Asia and Africa - is together with Crete, on a line that intersects the sea lane passages. Cyprus occupies a position between the Straits [of Hormouz], which separate Europe and Asia, and the Suez Canal, which separates Asia and Africa; while its current position is like a stable base and aircraft carrier, which acts like a pulse in the seaway of Aden and Hormouz, which together with the basins of the [Persian] Gulf and the Caspian Sea, are the most important lanes connecting Eurasia-Africa.

Page 176:

A country that ignores Cyprus can not be active in global and regional politics. In global politics it cannot be active, because this small island occupies a position that (may) directly affect the strategic linkages between Asia-Africa, Europe-Africa-Asia and Europe.

It cannot be active in regional policies, because Cyprus, with its eastern tip projects like an arrow towards the Middle East, whilst its western ridge is like a foundation stone of the strategic balance existing in the Eastern Mediterranean, the Balkans and North Africa.

Page 178:

Turkey, due to its geographic position, is influenced by many forces, but is required to assess its Cypriot policy, outside of the Turkish-Greek equation.

The Cyprus policy is a rapidly growing problem of Eurasia and Middle East-Balkan region (West Asia-Eastern Europe). The Cypriot policy [of Turkey] must be placed in a new strategic framework, appropriate to this new strategic context.

The Cyprus issue's importance, from Turkey’s perspective, can be traced along to two main axes.

One of them is the axis of humanitarian value, oriented towards ensuring the security of the Turkish Muslim community, as a result of the historical responsibility of Turkey. (...)

Page 179:

(...) A failure [of Turkey] to [possibly] secure and protect the Turkish community of Cyprus can be spread like a wave in Western Thrace and Bulgaria - and even in Azerbaijan and Bosnia.

The second important pillar of the Cyprus problem is the importance of the island from a geo-strategic viewpoint.

(...) Even if there was no Muslim Turks in Cyprus, Turkey is obliged to have a Cyprus issue. No country can remain indifferent towards such an island located in the heart of that vital area. (...)

Page 179:

This geo-strategic importance has two dimensions. One of them has a close strategic importance and relationship with the Turkish-Greek balance and T.D.V. Cyprus-Greek section [sic!] in the eastern Mediterranean.

The second dimension of the geo-strategic importance and significance is related to the position of the island within a global and regional strategy.

Page 180:

Cyprus cannot be ignored by any regional or global power which makes strategic calculations in the Middle East, Eastern Mediterranean, the Aegean Sea, the Suez, the Red Sea and the Gulf.

Cyprus is situated at such an ideal distance from all these areas which (may) affect each of them directly. Turkey’s strategic advantage on Cyprus gained in the 1970’s, must build on it not as part of a defensive Cypriot policy aimed at preserving the status quo, but providing fundamental support to an aggressive maritime strategy.

As stated before, this series of translations also helps to highlight what Turkey’s strategic moves mightbe over the next 10-15 years - intentions which markedly contradict the purported Greek-Turkish friendship.

Source: Anixneusis (Ioannis Mazis)

The illusion of Greek-Turkish friendship Part One

Over the last few weeks much has been written in the Greek press and amongst more ‘serious’ commentators about the appointment of Professor Ahmet Davutoglu as the Foreign Minister of Turkey. Antipodes also wrote about him here.

Dr Ioannis Mazis, Professor of Geopolitics and Economic Geography at the Ionian University, which Antipodes has posted excerpts from previous pieces here, recently wrote an article on the Greek reactions to Davotuglu’s appointment which appeared on the website of ERT3 talk show Anixneusis.

Mazis writes that Greeks generally reacted in the most ‘ostrich way possible' by referencing selectively certain readings from his books; particularly, in regards to his view of “zero friction with neighbours Turkey”. However, Mazis writes that these commentators have failed to understand who Davutoglu means when he writes about “neighbours” because judging by what Davutoglu writes, Greece and Cyprusshould not be included as ‘neighbours”.

Mazis then selects excerpts from Davutoglu's book entitled, "Stratejik Derinlik" or better known in English as "Strategic Depth", first published in 2001, which refutes the conclusions (inferred from their selective readings) reached by some Greek commentators. A careful analysis of Davutoglu's writings may also provide some clues as to Turkey's strategic direction over the next 10-15 years. Antipodes provides the first of a two part series of translations for its readers below:

Page 174:

(The latest developments have shown that) the U.S., in creating a dynamic relationship between their policies for Eastern Europe and the Middle East, they are seeking to have control of the Hinterland of Europe and to fill the geopolitical vacuum that occurred in the Balkans-Middle East axis after the dissolution of Soviet. Union. The Aegean Sea and Cyprus are two important parts due to the line Eastern Europe-Middle East in terms of a land connection and the Adriatic-East Mediterranean-Gulf in terms of a sea connection.

Page 175:

(. ...) In this strategic plan, the Cyprus issue will come to the forefront in a more active way. (....)

Today, the Eastern Europe-Balkan-Adriatic-Aegean-East Mediterranean-Middle East and Gulf area is forming a very dynamic interaction. (....)

On this line which unifies the Balkans to the Middle East will be the inevitable development of a new plan.

NATO joint administration of Aegean airspace

An interesting article titled "NATO joint administration of Aegean" written by Kyras Adam was published in the Greek daily, Eleftherotypia last week. The article reports on the recent agreement made between the Defence Chiefs of Greece and Turkey regarding the new NATO structure for the Aegean.

Essentially, the agreement stipulates the closure of the NATO centre at Eski Sechir, Turkey (6 CAOC) and transfer of responsibility to the corresponding NATO centre at Larissa, Greece (7 CAOC). The NATO centre at Larissa will periodically have a NATO commander from Turkey. Previously, the commander was exclusively Greek. The article continues:

The current Greek government, according to existing information, have long insisted that Turkey shut down Eski Sechir and for Greece to formalize air control (for the purposes of NATO) of Bulgarian, Albanian and FYROM airspace. Due to technical difficulties (related to its radar range) Turkey could not satisfy this role on behalf of NATO. However, the article claims that Athens has given in return the activation of a new NATO structure for the Aegean, which opens the door for NATO joint administration of the Aegean airspace - at least the period during when a Turkish commander controls the NATO centre at Larissa. The article claims the Turkish commander can reasonably do everything he can to create and maximize problems between Greece and NATO when Greek fighter aircraft intercept Turkish fighter jets in the Aegean.

In other words, the Turkish commander in undertaking his duties can "prohibit", or can denounce Greece, to NATO, for the use of Greek aircraft assigned to NATO for the interception of Turkish fighter aircraft (which have also been allocated to NATO) in the airspace of the Aegean.

Greece has just given away another piece of its sovereignty in order to conduct policing on behalf NATO.

Source: Eleftherotypia (Kyras Adam), Antipodes

The importance of the Aegean Sea-Dardanelles

People often bemoan that Greece has no geopolitical or geo-economic tools at its disposal in which it can use to formulate an effective international political strategy when dealing with its near abroad and even further away. Perhaps they have been overly influenced by former Prime Minister, Costas Simitis’s reductionist mentality that Greece is a “small, Balkan nation”, implying it has no place playing with third, second rate or even first rate powers. Of course, this is incorrect. However, one may be correct in stating that she does not use her geopolitical tools to her advantage.

A very important geopolitical and geo-economic tool is the Aegean Sea. The importance of this seaway is neatly summarised by Dr Ioannis Mazis, Professor of Geo-Economics and Geopolitics at the Ionian University, in an article titled, “Geopolitical Analysis of the Commercial Sea Channel Dardanelles-Aegean” which was originally published in the Archives of Economic History in 1997 (shortly after the Imia crisis). Although, the article is somewhat dated and poorly translated it is also surprising how very little has changed in Greek-Turkish relations regarding the Aegean Sea over the last 10-15 years.

The article begins by explaining the importance of the Aegean Sea as a sea route and air passage between Europe and Turkey and the broader Eastern Mediterranean, and between the former Soviet Republics of Russia, Ukraine (including the shipment of oil and gas from Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan etc.) and the Mediterranean Sea. Interestingly, Mazis writes that the Aegean airspace is one of the main airways connecting Israel with the United States and Western Europe which is of major importance for the survival of Israel - with the implication that Israel would never consent to the occupation of this airspace by an unfriendly power. He concludes that the Aegean Sea is a very important space in the context of geopolitical dynamics and control and is an asset for whichever power has sovereign rights over it.

Regarding Greece's maritime borders, the present 6 nautical miles extension from land means there are strips of international waters between the Aegean islands and islets providing for a "Sea Crossing" for ships moving unheeded between the Black Sea/Dardanelles and the Mediterranean Sea. However, Greece can effectively close the Aegean Sea if she extends her maritime borders. Mazis writes:

According to estimations taken seriously by the American government, the extension of Greek territorial waters from 6 to 12 miles - which is absoulutely legitimate according to the International Sea Law - would cede 72% of the Aegean Sea to Greece and only 9% to Turkey; at the same time, the percentage of international waters would fall to some 19%, closing almost all sea passages and "transforming the Aegean Sea into a Greek lake" creating "similar stifling situations" as in the airspace , according to Turkish declarations.

Mazis also points out that control of the Aegean Sea on its own is not does not confer as much power as controlling the Aegean Sea and the Dardanelles together (the narrow straits separating the Aegean Sea from the Black Sea) which perhaps provides clues as to Turkey's long-term strategy. He writes:

An Aegean without "Straits" [Dardanelles] lacks substance. One must control the block of Aegean-Straits otherwise the control of the Aegean Sea or the Straits is meaningless.

Source: Archives of Economic History (Ioannis Mazis), Antipodes

Relations with Russia?

The Greek newspaper, Eleftheros recently published an article titled "Russia and us" written by Apostolos Apostolopoulos which can be accessed here. The article raises a number of important questions and makes a few relevant points about carefully thinking through Greece’s stuttering relations with Russia.

Recently, there has been talk about the need for a “polygamous” foreign policy because our monogamous relationship with the United States does not deliver. The U.S. President, Barack Obama has disappointed us and some (such as international jurist Vassilis Markezinis) suggests that we re-approach Moscow as a counterbalancing measure. This sounds fine. Moreover, others more powerful than Greece have preceded us, such as Germany which has re-approached Moscow slowly and carefully but steadily. Also (we should not forget), Mr Karamanlis, following the German example, launched the gas pipeline policy; namely, the South Stream project. Previously, Mr Tsochatzopoulos, formerly the Defence Minister, purchased anti-aircraft defence systems from Russia for the first time. The two politicians (from opposing parties) have opened doors.

Neither the supply of weapons systems nor the construction of gas pipelines; such as the South Stream project; however, were a general prelude to the reorientation of our foreign policy, although they were of special importance. That is why the reactions of the United States were intense and visible. However, have we posed the question, during our warm embraces with Putin, if these reactions were considered carefully enough? The recent distancing, hesitations and retractions that have occurred in our relations with Russia, indicate there was probably insufficient consideration made of these possible reactions. It would have been useful to have considered more carefully the difficulties of re-approaching Russia.

The first question we should pose is whether the idea of re-approaching Russia suggests a general re-orientation of our foreign policy, and consequently, a distancing from the Western fold. Without clarifying this, the “question” is simply unrealistic.

The second question is what we have to offer to Russia. For example, Turkey offers services to the United States and extracts favours. What we can offer to the Russians so that we have their steady support?

The third question, and perhaps the most critical, is what the Russians want and especially what can the Russians give us? Recognising that Greece is part of the larger (and still unresolved) Eastern Question.

Inertia and unconditional obedience (to the United States) has lead to poor foreign policy but also “steps" (towards Russia) without clearly defined objectives can also be destructive. With upcoming European elections, the parties should be explaining to Greeks how they believe Greece should be maneuvering itself in the world. But with the Pavlidis issue at the centre of our political life our thinking about these issues is limited.

Source: Eleftheros (Apostolos Apostolopoulos)

The absurdity of Cypriot "inter-communal talks"

The Cypriot newspaper Simerini recently published a caustic but insightful article (written in Greek) by Lazaros Mavros titled “Neither Inter-Communal and Neither Talks”. The article which can be read in Greek here provides a somewhat Realist interpretation of the historical and ongoing inter-communal talks between the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriot minority. Here is the full text translated into English:

For many years now, for almost three decades, we write and print articles containing two words inside quotation marks, “inter-communal talks”. Controversially, how much are they actually inter-communal or indeed talks?

Regarding the first term, “inter-communal”, the last few decades have proved that it has been used to mislead, as the representative of the so-called “Turkish Cypriot community” was and is, in fact, a representative, an agent and instrument of theTurkish invaders. And using the “vehicle” and strategic bridgehead of the Turkish Cypriot minority - which is entirely controlled by Ankara - the Turks have attempted to expand their control over the entire island.

The second term in quotation marks, “talks”, has shown during the last few decades what was obvious from the beginning: with a Turkish pistol to the temple, the talks were a process of imposing the objectives of the invader onto their victims, with a view towards final capitulation.

The acceptance, from the victim, of “inter-communal talks” legitimised the process; being “clothed” under the auspices of the UN, and mainly accommodated, the United States and the United Kingdom. It also exempted….the rest of the international community…..from this headache! Ultimately, neither the internal practices, operations and occasional results of the “inter-communal talks”, in whatever form, have salvaged the concept of actual negotiations and talks. Currently, abandoned to a point considered unthinkable, is the basic rule of negotiations, that “none of those discussed, proposed, negotiated, binds the parties, except if they reach a final, comprehensive agreement”!

The clear result is that henceforth, the current Greek Cypriot negotiator Mr Christofias - who considers himself bound to what the previous negotiators, the Presidents of the Republic of Cyprus, consented to during the “talks” - is completely indifferent to the fact that the sovereign people of Cyprus rejected on 24 April 2004, with a 76% vote, all the results and derivations of the so-called “inter-communal talks” that were incorporated into the “Annan Plan". And he is indifferent to the internal declarations of the Annan Plan that it will be rendered dead and buried if it is rejected......

Source: Simerini (Lazaros Mavros)

The United States as the New Byzantium

Edward Luttwak has published several works on military strategy, history and international relations. Since the 1980s he has also published articles on Byzantium and is the author of the forthcoming "Grand Strategy of the Byzantine Empire" which is due to be released by Harvard University Press later this year.

Luttwak was born into a Jewish family in Romania, raised in Italy and England. He attended the London School of Economics and Johns Hopkins University, where he received a PhD. In 2008, he became a Senior Advisor at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). This is the same think-tank that was cited in a previous Antipodes post titled “Upgrading U.S.-Turkish relations and winning Greek-American votes” which can be accessed here. His profile at CSIS can be found here.

Luttwak has worked for a number of years as a consultant in the Deep State and military-industrial complex of the United States, including: the Office of the Secretary of Defense; the National Security Council; the US Department of State; the US Navy; US Army; US Air Force; and several NATO defense ministries. The Jewish-American magazine, Forward has published an interesting article on Luttwak and his shady dealings within these organisations which can be accessed here.

His book "Coup d'État: A Practical Handbook" is perhaps his best-known work; it has been reprinted numerous times and translated into 14 languages. "The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire from the First Century AD to the Third" remains controversial.

Luttwak has now turned his complete attention onto the Byzantine Empire. The introduction on the Harvard University Press website (which can be accessed here) states:

“The Byzantine empire so greatly outlasted its western counterpart because its rulers were able to adapt strategically to diminished circumstances, by devising new ways of coping with successive enemies. It relied less on military strength and more on persuasion—to recruit allies, dissuade threatening neighbors, and manipulate potential enemies into attacking one another instead. Even when the Byzantines fought—which they often did with great skill—they were less inclined to destroy their enemies than to contain them, for they were aware that today’s enemies could be tomorrow’s allies.”

Luttwak is so apparently enamoured with Byzantium that he espouses that the United States should emulate the Byzantine rather than the Roman Empire. The Italian newspaper, La Stampa ran an articled which stated Luttwak tries to prove basically three things (similar to the above) about Byzantium's survival:

• It learned from its enemies whenever it could;
• It did not pursue the former Roman strategy of annihilation of its enemies;
• It developed a formidable political and diplomatic clout that carefully played allies and adversaries for its own ends.

Of course, people can probably learn more from reading Byzantine primary texts on strategy and tactics often written by Emperors and Generals themselves - rather than some American. Information on these texts can be found here and here.